FINALBECKWITH.DOC

2/3/2020 2:49 PM

A Liberty Not Fully Evolved?:
The Case of Rodney LeVake and
the Right of Public School
Teachers to Criticize
Darwinism

FRANCIS J. BECKWITH*

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.
II.
III.

IV.

INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................ 1311
LEVAKE’S STORY ............................................................................................ 1312
THE COURT OF APPEALS’ OPINION ................................................................... 1314
A. Due Process and Free Exercise Claims ................................................. 1314
B. The Free Speech Claim and the Nature of
Academic Freedom ................................................................................ 1316
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................... 1325

I. INTRODUCTION
In 2001, the Minnesota Court of Appeals reviewed the case of Rodney
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district’s required science curriculum by suggesting to students
alternative viewpoints inconsistent with that curriculum.1 This case,
LeVake v. Independent School District,2 should be of great interest to
legal theorists. Its holding, and the reasoning on which it is based, may
serve as a Socratic provocation regarding the extent to which public
school teachers have constitutional academic freedom (apart from
statutory requirements or permission) to voluntarily include criticisms of
and alternatives to evolutionary theory.
II. LEVAKE’S STORY
Rodney LeVake was hired as a math and science teacher by his school
district in 1984. During the summer of 1997, LeVake was offered an
opportunity to teach tenth grade biology in the forthcoming school year.
Prior to teaching the class, he conferred with both the principal and the
co-chair of the science department about the required curriculum as well
as the course itself. According to the requirements, “upon completion of
the class, students will be able to understand that evolution involves
natural selection and mutations, which constantly cause changes in
living things.”3 The required text included three chapters on evolution,
only one of which the teacher was obligated to cover. These chapters
contained no criticisms of evolution, nor did they offer any alternative
theories. Knowing the curriculum and what was expected of him,
LeVake agreed to teach the course.4
When he taught the course in Spring 1998, LeVake dedicated only one
day, including a lab, to the topic of evolution. Although the other
biology teachers also did not spend a lot of time covering the topic
because of a shortened school year, the co-chair of the science
department told the principal and LeVake that he was concerned that
LeVake’s teaching of evolution had been inadequate. The court wrote
that LeVake “essentially told [the co-chair] that he could not teach
evolution according to the prescribed curriculum.”5 At an April 1, 1998
meeting with the science department co-chair, principal, and curriculum
director, “LeVake indicated that he did not regard evolution as a viable
scientific concept.”6 LeVake was asked by the curriculum director
whether he “mentioned God or the Bible in class because she wanted to
1. See LeVake v. Indep. Sch. Dist., 625 N.W.2d 502 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001),
review denied, No. C8-00-1613, 2001 Minn. LEXIS 434, at *1 (Minn. July 24, 2001),
and cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 814 (2002).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 505.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
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be sure that [he] was not discussing religion in a manner that would give
the impression that the school was not religiously neutral.”7 At an April
7, 1998 department meeting, organized to discuss LeVake’s teaching of
the curriculum, LeVake was asked by his principal to compose an essay
on how he planned in the future to instruct his biology students on the
topic of evolution. LeVake complied and submitted an essay explaining
his position that there is no evidence for evolution and that the theory is
impossible biologically, anatomically, and physiologically.8 LeVake
maintained that “the complexity of life that we see around us is a
testimony that evolution, as it is currently being handled in our text, is
impossible.”9 He went on to say:
I don’t believe an unquestioning faith in the theory of evolution is foundational
to the goals I have stated in teaching my students about themselves, their
responsibilities, and gaining a sense of awe for what they see around them. I
will teach, should the department decide that it is appropriate, the theory of
evolution. I will also accompany that treatment of evolution with an honest
look at the difficulties and inconsistencies of the theory without turning my
class into a religious one.10

After conferring with the school district’s attorneys, the curriculum
director, and others, the principal made a decision to remove LeVake
from teaching tenth grade biology and to appoint him to teach a ninth
grade natural science course instead. The following day LeVake was
told of his reassignment. The principal based his decision on his
“concern that a basic concept of biology, meaning the theory of
evolution, would be diluted and that students would ‘lose the gist’ of the
theory.”11 LeVake appealed this decision to the superintendent, who
subsequently rejected LeVake’s appeal because he “believed that
LeVake differed fundamentally with the ‘commonly held principles of
the curriculum outlined,’” and that “LeVake’s insistence on teaching the
inconsistencies of evolution was not an appropriate method for teaching
the approved curriculum.”12 On May 24, 1999, LeVake filed a lawsuit
against the school district, its superintendent, LeVake’s principal, the
science department co-chair, and the curriculum director.13 LeVake
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Id.
Id. at 505–06.
Id. at 506 (internal quotes omitted).
Id. (emphasis omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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claimed that the “respondents violated his right to free exercise of
religion, free speech, due process, freedom of conscience, and academic
freedom.”14 The district court granted the respondents’ motion for
summary judgment. LeVake appealed that ruling to the Minnesota
Court of Appeals and the appeals court affirmed the district court
ruling.15
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS’ OPINION
The court of appeals divided its analysis into the following three parts:
freedom of religion, free speech, and due process.16 In order for LeVake
to have prevailed on appeal he would have had to raise a genuine issue
of material fact concerning at least one of the fundamental rights that he
claimed the defendants violated.
A. Due Process and Free Exercise Claims
Of the three, LeVake’s due process claim was the weakest because
LeVake was provided with “sufficient notice about what he could and
could not teach through the established curriculum and the syllabus,”
and his contract “required him to ‘faithfully perform the teaching . . .
prescribed by the School Board.’”17 In his deposition LeVake essentially
confessed that he told the science department co-chair “that [he could
not] teach evolution.”18 In addition, LeVake’s argument relied on
teacher termination cases, but “he was not even demoted.”19
However, suppose LeVake had been told in advance that the
curriculum required that he publicly deny his Christian faith while
affirming a belief in atheism, or face reassignment or possibly demotion,
but only after a hearing. Even if LeVake had agreed to these terms, the
fact that he was given advance notice and afforded a hearing does not
speak to the substance of the terms to which he agreed. Consequently,
even though the court was correct that LeVake’s claim of procedural
malfeasance had little merit, it does not follow that the school did not
violate his substantive rights. The court assessed these alleged violations
under two general categories: freedom of religion and freedom of speech.
The court rejected LeVake’s freedom of religion claim on the grounds
that “[he] does not contend that the respondents prohibited him from
14.
15.
16.
17.
district).
18.
19.
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practicing the religion of his choice” or that they “demanded that he
refrain from practicing his religion outside of the scope of his duties as a
public school teacher in order to retain his teaching position, and he does
not assert that the curriculum requirements incidentally infringed on his
religious practice.”20 However, LeVake did not seem to be arguing that
the school interfered with his religious practice, but rather, that he was
reassigned because of his religious beliefs. The court conceded as much
when it pointed out that LeVake had used “employment discrimination
cases to argue that circumstantial evidence of discrimination based on
his religious belief exists.”21 Aside from the question of whether it was
appropriate to analogize from employment discrimination cases when
LeVake had not brought an employment discrimination action, the court
maintained that LeVake had “not provided authority demonstrating how
the use of this standard raises a genuine issue of material fact regarding
his free exercise claim.”22 This last statement is particularly odd since
the court, under its free speech analysis, seemed to implicitly concede
that LeVake had raised a genuine issue of material fact concerning free
exercise and that LeVake was in fact reassigned because of his belief,
when it wrote that the school’s “concern about [LeVake’s] inability to
teach the prescribed curriculum was well-founded” because it was
“[b]ased on LeVake’s belief that evolution is not a viable theory.”23
The court’s free exercise analysis was terribly confusing. The court of
appeals seemed to use the terms “belief” and “practice” interchangeably
even though the Supreme Court has recognized a clear distinction between
the two. State action that discriminates against someone because of his
or her religious belief is de facto unconstitutional,24 whereas a state
action that discriminates against a citizen because of his or her religious
20. Id. at 507 (citation omitted).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 509 (emphasis added).
24. In McDaniel v. Paty, the Supreme Court referred to the “Free Exercise
Clause’s absolute prohibition of infringements on the ‘freedom to believe.’” 435 U.S.
618, 627 (1978). The Court asserted in Everson v. Board of Education: “No person can
be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church
attendance or non-attendance.” 330 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1947). According to Eugene
Volokh, “The government generally may not prosecute someone or otherwise burden
them . . . for their religious beliefs.” EUGENE VOLOKH, THE FIRST AMENDMENT:
PROBLEMS, CASES AND POLICY ARGUMENTS 670 (2001) (citing McDaniel, 435 U.S. at
627). See also Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940); Torcaso v. Watkins,
367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961).
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practice is prima facie constitutional if it is the result of a generally
applicable law.25 Thus, because the court conceded that LeVake’s
reassignment was based on his beliefs, an act that is de facto
unconstitutional, the court should have ruled in his favor on those
grounds.26
B. The Free Speech Claim and the Nature of Academic Freedom
The court rejected LeVake’s free speech claim as well. It relied on
cases that focus on “a public employee’s free speech rights,”27 including
two cases that involved conflicts between a teacher’s freedom of
expression and his employer: Clark v. Holmes28 and Webster v. New
Lenox School District.29 Because these cases were intermingled by the
court in its analysis, it is necessary to first make a few comments about
Webster and Holmes and then discuss the general question of the extent
to which a particular set of public employees, school teachers, possess
freedom of speech in their primary workplace, the classroom, and how it
applies to the concern of this Essay.
In 1990, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed a district
court decision to dismiss the complaint of a public school teacher, Ray
Webster.30 The Seventh Circuit ruled that Webster, who taught junior
high, had not had his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights violated
when the superintendent, writing on behalf of the school board,
instructed Webster by letter that “he should restrict his classroom
instruction to the curriculum and refrain from advocating a particular
religious viewpoint.”31 He was “specifically instructed not to teach
creation science, because the teaching of this theory had been held by the
federal courts to be religious advocacy.”32 The reason for disciplinary
25. See, e.g., Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U. S. 872, 879 (1990).
26. Someone may reply that LeVake’s belief in evolution’s falsity is not religious
but merely secular, and thus is not protected under the First Amendment’s Free Exercise
Clause. After all, LeVake admitted that he would critique evolution in the classroom in
an entirely nonsectarian manner. Nevertheless, the Court has ruled that freedom of
religious belief is grounded in a more general liberty of belief: “If there is any fixed star
in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what
shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force
citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.” West Virginia State Bd. of Educ.
v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
27. LeVake, 625 N.W.2d at 508.
28. Clark v. Holmes, 474 F.2d 928 (7th Cir. 1972).
29. Webster v. New Lenox Sch. Dist., 917 F.2d 1004 (7th Cir. 1990).
30. Id. at 1008.
31. Id. at 1005.
32. Id. at 1006 (citing Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 592 (1987) (holding
that creation science “embodies the religious belief that a supernatural creator was
responsible for the creation of humankind”)).
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action arose when Webster included in his lesson plans “nonevolutionary
theories of creation to rebut a statement in the social studies textbook
indicating that the world is over four billion years old.”33 Webster defended
himself against the charge of having violated the Establishment Clause
by arguing that “at most, he encouraged students to explore alternative
viewpoints.”34
The court’s holding in Webster dealt with the narrow question of
whether Webster had “a first amendment right to determine the curriculum
content of his junior high school class.”35 Given the controversial
content of Webster’s extracurricular lessons—creation science has been
repudiated as inherently religious by a number of other courts including
the U.S. Supreme Court36—and the school board’s responsibility in
shaping curriculum and avoiding Establishment Clause violations in its
institutions, Webster’s First and Fourteenth Amendment rights were not
violated. That is, the court held that a school may censor classroom
instruction that seeks to promote or advance a particular religious belief
such as creation science.37 On the other hand, the court admitted that
“this case does not present the issue of whether, or under what
circumstances, a school board may completely eliminate material from
the curriculum,”38 but rather, what was dispositive in the case was “the
principle that an individual teacher has no right to ignore the directives
of duly appointed education authorities.”39 Given that LeVake did not
teach, and was not trying to teach, creation science, Webster is not quite
on point.
The Clark case concerned a temporary full-time faculty member at
Northern Illinois University (NIU).40 L. Verdelle Clark was offered a
two year appointment in 1962 by the department of biological sciences,
but he was warned in the department’s offer letter that:
[H]is acceptance . . . should be made with the understanding that he should
remedy certain deficiencies in his professional conduct: he counselled an
excessive number of students instead of referring them to NIU’s professional
counsellors; he overemphasized sex in his health survey course; he counselled
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1007.
36. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 594 (1987). The courts have
employed the terms “creation science” and “creationism” interchangeably.
37. Webster, 917 F.2d at 1008.
38. Id. (citation omitted).
39. Id.
40. Clark v. Holmes, 474 F.2d 928, 929–30 (7th Cir. 1972).
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students with his office door closed; and he belittled other staff members in
discussions with students.41

Germane to our analysis of LeVake is Clark’s claim that his academic
freedom—as a species of freedom of speech—was violated by the
university when it did not offer him another contract because, in its
judgment, he did not remedy the professional deficiencies he agreed to
remedy when he accepted the offer of appointment. The court rejected
Clark’s claim on the grounds that “academic freedom” is not “a license
for uncontrolled expression at variance with established curricular
contents and internally destructive of the proper functioning of the
institution. First Amendment rights must be applied in light of the
special characteristics of the environment in the particular case.”42 The
court relied on a balancing test extracted from Pickering v. Board of
Education,43 a case to which both the plaintiff and defendants appealed
in Clark44 and which the LeVake court cited in its analysis of the free
speech rights of public employees.45
[I]t cannot be gainsaid that the State has interests as an employer in
regulating the speech of its employees that differ significantly from those it
possesses in connection with regulation of the speech of the citizenry in general.
The problem in any case is to arrive at a balance between the interests of the
teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the
interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public
services it performs through its employees.46

Consequently, the question for the court in LeVake was whether the
school’s reassignment of LeVake violated his freedom of speech given
(1) his prior performance of not teaching the curriculum adequately, (2)
his claim not to believe in evolution, (3) his early assertion that he could
not teach the curriculum, and (4) his promise in his essay that he would
teach evolution in the future along with nonreligious criticisms of the
theory. Given the totality of these facts (but excluding the second point
because it may be a religious belief and thus cannot be the basis for state
41. Id. at 930.
42. Id. at 931 (citation omitted).
43. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
44. The court wrote:
Both parties claim to find support in Pickering v. Board of Education . . . a
major pronouncement of the First Amendment rights of public school teachers.
There, the Supreme Court reversed the dismissal of a teacher who had written
a letter to a local newspaper in which he, as a citizen, criticized the Board of
Education’s allocation of school funds and its method of informing the
district’s taxpayers about the need for additional tax revenue.
Clark, 474 F.2d at 930 (citation omitted).
45. LeVake, 625 N.W.2d at 508.
46. Clark, 474 F.2d at 931 (alteration in original) (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at
568).
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action), it appears that Mr. LeVake was reassigned because his superiors
were not confident that he would teach the course as required in the
curriculum. In light of the deference accorded states in matters of public
education, and given the school district’s legal duty to teach the
curriculum correctly, the court seemed to have balanced the interests of
LeVake and the school district appropriately.
However, under a different set of facts, LeVake might have had a
strong academic freedom claim. Suppose LeVake had accepted the offer
to teach the biology class, agreed to teach the curriculum in precisely the
way he was told to do so, and subsequently taught everything required in
the curriculum. Now suppose that he also offered nonreligious criticisms of
evolution that were neither in the textbook nor in the required
curriculum but had been developed and defended by qualified and
credentialed scholars in respected venues.47 Imagine that the arguments
offered by these scholars propose conclusions whose premises do not
contain the Book of Genesis and its tenets as explicit or implicit
propositions. These premises and their propositions, unlike those of
creationism,48 are not derived from, nor are they grounded in, any
47. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. BEHE, DARWIN’S BLACK BOX: THE BIOCHEMICAL
CHALLENGE TO EVOLUTION (1996) (Behe earned a Ph.D. in biochemistry from University
of Pennsylvania and is currently a Professor of Biological Sciences at Lehigh University
in Pennsylvania); WILLIAM A. DEMBSKI, NO FREE LUNCH: WHY SPECIFIED COMPLEXITY
CANNOT BE PURCHASED WITHOUT INTELLIGENCE (2002) (Dembski earned Ph.D.’s in
philosophy and mathematics from University of Illinois and University of Chicago
respectively and is currently an Associate Research Professor in the Conceptual
Foundations of Science at Baylor University); WILLIAM A. DEMBSKI, THE DESIGN
INFERENCE: ELIMINATING CHANCE THROUGH SMALL PROBABILITIES (1998); Robert Kaita,
Design in Physics & Biology: Cosmological Principle & Cosmic Imperative?, in MERE
CREATION: SCIENCE, FAITH & INTELLIGENT DESIGN 385 (William A. Dembski ed., 1998)
(Kaita earned a Ph.D. in physics from Rutgers University and now serves as a Principal
Research Physicist in the Plasma Physics Laboratory at Princeton University); Alvin
Plantinga, An Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism, in FAITH IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE: ESSAYS ON JUSTIFYING RELIGIOUS BELIEF 35 (Carol White and Elizabeth
Radcliffe eds. 1993) (Plantinga earned a Ph.D. in philosophy from Yale University and is
now a John A. O’Brien Professor of Philosophy at University of Notre Dame); ALVIN
PLANTINGA, WARRANT AND PROPER FUNCTION 216–37 (1993); DEL RATZSCH, NATURE,
DESIGN AND SCIENCE: THE STATUS OF DESIGN IN NATURAL SCIENCE (2001) (Ratzsch
earned a Ph.D. in philosophy from University of Massachusetts, Amherst and is
currently a Professor of Philosophy at Calvin College).
48. The Court’s historical problem with the creationism curriculum required in the
statute struck down in Edwards was its transparent connection to the Book of Genesis
and the contents of previously repudiated statutes in Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97,
109 (1968), and McLean v. Arkansas Board of Education, 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1272
(1982). In Epperson, the Court struck down on Establishment Clause grounds an
Arkansas statute that forbade the teaching of evolution in public schools, because the
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particular religion’s interpretation of its special revelation. Rather, they
are the result of empirical facts, well-grounded conceptual notions, and
critical reflection. They subsequently serve as the basis from which one
may infer that an intelligent agent is likely responsible for the existence
of certain apparently natural phenomena. That is, evolution provides an
answer to the very same question that this alternative is said to provide
an answer: What is the origin of apparent design in biological organisms
or other aspects of the natural universe or the universe as a whole?
Evolution answers the question by appealing exclusively to the forces of
unguided matter—or energy,49 the latter includes intelligent agency as a
prohibition was based on evolution’s inconsistency with the Genesis account of origins,
a religious point of view. Epperson, 393 U.S. at 103. In McLean, the federal district
court struck down on Establishment Clause grounds an Arkansas statute that required
public schools to offer balanced treatment of evolution and creationism, because the
definition of “creationism” is transparently identical to the Genesis-account of origins, a
religious point of view. McLean, 529 F. Supp at 1259–64. The Edwards court declared
as unconstitutional, on Establishment Clause grounds, a Louisiana statute (the Balanced
Treatment Act) that required the state’s public schools to teach creationism if evolution
was taught and to teach evolution if creationism was taught. Edwards, 482 U.S. at 589.
It concluded that the true purpose of the Act was to advance a particular religious
viewpoint, the Genesis account of creation. Id. at 593. Like the courts in Epperson and
McLean, the Edwards court looked at the “historic and contemporaneous link between
the teachings of certain religious denominations and the teaching of evolution.” Id. at
590. Therefore, the courts in Edwards, Epperson, and McLean were asking the question:
How closely does the curricular content required by the statute parallel the creation story
in Genesis, or is the curricular content prohibited by the statute proscribed because it is
inconsistent with the creation story in Genesis? Consequently, public school science
teachers that voluntarily add an alternative theory to, or criticism of, evolution to the
prescribed curriculum do not violate the Establishment Clause if they do not violate any
other legal duties and if their lessons do not appeal, either explicitly or implicitly, to the
authority of the Book of Genesis (or any other religious text), which was the basis for the
courts’ repudiation of creationism in the cases listed above.
49. Evolution, as understood in the literature, is a grand materialist explanation for
the diversity and apparent design of entities that make up what we call nature, including
both organic and inorganic entities. In the words of Douglas Futuyama, “order in nature
is no evidence of design.” DOUGLAS J. FUTUYMA, SCIENCE ON TRIAL: THE CASE FOR
EVOLUTION 114 (1995). “Darwin’s great contribution,” wrote philosopher James
Rachels, “was the final demolition of the idea that nature is the product of intelligent
design.” JAMES RACHELS, CREATED FROM ANIMALS: THE MORAL IMPLICATIONS OF
DARWINISM 110 (1990). However, Jay Wexler disagrees with this analysis. He asserts
that “evolution in pure form addresses only the question of how living creatures change
over time. It does not address the question of origins nor does it postulate the meaning
of life. It deals only with proximate causes, not ultimate ones.” Jay D. Wexler, Note, Of
Pandas, People, and the First Amendment: The Constitutionality of Teaching Intelligent
Design in the Public Schools, 49 STAN. L. REV. 439, 462 n.212 (1997) (citations
omitted). As I have noted elsewhere, Wexler is simply mistaken. See FRANCIS J.
BECKWITH, LAW, DARWINISM AND PUBLIC EDUCATION: THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE AND
THE CHALLENGE OF INTELLIGENT DESIGN (forthcoming 2003) (manuscript at chapter 4,
on file with author). If all that is meant by evolution is that biological species adapt over
time to changing environments and pass on those adaptations genetically to their
offspring, even most creationists would not disagree with that modest definition of
evolution. But that is not what many citizens find objectionable about evolution, and it
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legitimate cause that may account for some apparently natural
phenomena. The Supreme Court maintained that its holding in Edwards
v. Aguillard50 did “not imply that a legislature could never require that
scientific critiques of prevailing scientific theories be taught.”51 The
Court asserted that “teaching a variety of scientific theories about the
origins of humankind to schoolchildren might be validly done with the
clear secular intent of enhancing the effectiveness of science
instruction.”52 Granted, the conclusions inferred by the premises of
these arguments may be consistent with and lend support to a tenet or
tenets of a particular belief system, but that in itself would not make it
constitutionally suspect. As Justice Powell wrote in his Edwards
concurrence, “A decision respecting the subject matter to be taught in
public schools does not violate the Establishment Clause simply because
the material to be taught ‘happens to coincide or harmonize with the
tenets of some or all religions.’”53 If LeVake had offered to his students
an alternative point of view, such as the one just suggested, and if his
employer had then prohibited him from engaging in such speech during
class time, he surely would have had a case with law in his favor.
Given these different set of facts, the other public employee free
speech cases on which the court relied either support or do not address
the point of principle that grounds LeVake’s free speech rights as a
particular type of public employee, a high school teacher. Finch v.
Wemlinger54 did not deal with a teacher’s classroom instruction, but with
“an unclassified employee in the Governor’s Manpower Office (GMO),”
and his firing after he publicly criticized his superiors.55 Similarly,
Terrell v. University of Texas System Police56 dealt with “a public
is not what is actually defended by proponents of evolutionary theory. What these
citizens find objectionable, and what is actually affirmed in the literature, is the
methodological naturalism that evolution presupposes (that is, only nonagent, naturalistic
explanations may count as “scientific knowledge”) and the ontological materialism it
entails (that is, because all that exists, or all that we can know, is the material world, one
is never warranted in affirming that a nonmaterial agent is the cause of a natural
phenomenon).
50. 482 U.S. at 578.
51. Id. at 593.
52. Id. at 594.
53. Id. at 605 (Powell, J., concurring) (quoting Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 319
(1980)).
54. Finch v. Wemlinger, 361 N.W.2d 865 (Minn. 1985), cited in LeVake, 625
N.W.2d at 508.
55. Id. at 866.
56. Terrell v. Univ. of Texas Sys. Police, 792 F.2d 1360 (5th Cir. 1986), cited in
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employee” of the university police system, who “was fired when his
secret diary, which was critical of his supervisor, fell into the
supervisor’s hands.”57 The case of Mount Healthy City School District
Board of Education v. Doyle58 dealt with a nontenured teacher with a
history of troublemaking and public altercations who was not rehired
after an incident involving his releasing to a local radio station a memo
from his principal having to do with the appearance and dress of
teachers.59 The case did not address what is germane to LeVake—the
extent of a teacher’s academic freedom in the classroom. Although in
Mount Healthy the Supreme Court accepted “the District Court’s finding
that the [teacher’s] communication was protected by the First and
Fourteenth Amendments,” it is “not . . . entirely in agreement with that
court’s manner of reasoning from this finding to the conclusion that
Doyle is entitled to reinstatement with backpay.”60 Relying on the
Pickering balancing test,61 the Court vacated and remanded the case
back to the district court telling it that it “should have gone on to
determine whether the Board had shown by a preponderance of the
evidence that it would have reached the same decision as to respondent’s
reemployment even in the absence of the protected conduct.”62
The LeVake court cited Keyishian v. Board of Regents,63 involving
two faculty members and one librarian who were dismissed by their
employer, the State University of New York, for not signing statemandated loyalty oaths.64 The faculty members refused to sign a
certificate indicating that they were not Communists and the librarian
refused to sign a document indicating that he was not a member of a
subversive organization that sought or advocated the forceful and violent
overthrow of the U.S. government.65 Ironically, given the different set
of facts proposed in this Essay, the Court’s decision in Keyishian would
tend to support rather than undermine LeVake’s academic freedom to
teach criticisms of evolution. In Keyishian, the Court held that the New
York statutes on which the firings were based were “invalid insofar as
they proscribe mere knowing membership without any showing of
LeVake, 625 N.W.2d at 508.
57. Id. at 1361.
58. Mount Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977),
cited in LeVake, 625 N.W.2d at 508.
59. Id. at 281–82.
60. Id. at 284.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 287.
63. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967), cited in LeVake, 625
N.W.2d at 508.
64. Id. at 592.
65. Id.
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specific intent to further the unlawful aims of the Communist Party of
the United States or of the State of New York.”66 Thus, the mere fact
that LeVake believes that evolutionary theory is false, or may belong to
an organization or group that intends to circumvent the law in order to
further this belief,67 does not show any specific intent on LeVake’s part
to teach religion (creation science) or to teach the curriculum incorrectly,
both of which would be unlawful. In addition, the Keyishian holding is
replete with assertions about the value of academic freedom and that the
classroom ought to be a free “marketplace of ideas.”68 For example, the
Court wrote:
Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which is of
transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the teachers concerned. That
freedom is therefore a special concern of the First Amendment, which does not
tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom. ‘The vigilant
protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the
community of American schools.’69

Clearly the LeVake court was correct that academic freedom in public
schools is not absolute and must be balanced by other state interests—
Clark, Pickering, Webster, and Mount Healthy unambiguously affirm
this. However, if LeVake would have taught the curriculum adequately
and included relevant materials critical of evolution, as in the fictional

66. Id. at 609–10.
67. The curriculum director’s request that LeVake answer questions about his
religious beliefs so that she may infer whether LeVake would unlawfully teach the
prescribed curriculum seems analogous to trying to find out if a faculty member is a
Communist and inferring from it that the faculty member intends to engage in an
unlawful overthrow of the government. One account of LeVake’s case published in a
conservative Christian magazine, reads:
LeVake was even more amazed when the curriculum director asked him
whether he ever mentioned God or the Bible in his science class. He said no.
Then she asked whether his students knew he was a Christian.
“That was one that I couldn’t answer right away. I would like to have
said, ‘Yes, they do know, just because of the way I act.’ But I didn’t want to
say it that way because she would probably think that I was proselytizing in
my classroom. So I said, ‘I would hope so because I don’t curse, and I don’t
do things that would make people think I’m not a Christian.’”
Although he was surprised by the questions, LeVake said, “It gave me
some light on where they were coming from. Those questions betrayed what
they were thinking.”
Frank York, No Admittance, TEACHERS IN FOCUS 2000, http://www.family.org/cforum/
teachersmag/features/a0009437.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2002).
68. Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603.
69. Id. (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960)).
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scenario above, he could have benefited from vast case law on his side.70
First, the Court in Epperson acknowledged the academic freedom of
teachers and students as grounded in their First Amendment right of
freedom of expression:
Our courts . . . have not failed to apply the First Amendment’s mandate in our
educational system where essential to safeguard the fundamental values of
freedom of speech and inquiry and of belief. By and large, public education in
our Nation is committed to the control of state and local authorities. Courts do
not and cannot intervene in the resolution of conflicts which arise in the daily
operation of school systems and which do not directly and sharply implicate
basic constitutional values.
. . . The Court . . . [has] acknowledged the State’s power to prescribe the
school curriculum, but it held [in Meyer v. Nebraska71] that these were not
adequate to support the restriction upon the liberty of teacher and pupil.72

According to a district court in Moore v. Gaston County Board of
Education,73 “[t]hat teachers are entitled to First Amendment freedoms
is an issue no longer in dispute,”74 because “[a]lthough academic
freedom is not one of the enumerated rights of the First Amendment, the
Supreme Court has on numerous occasions emphasized that the right to
teach, to inquire, to evaluate and to study is fundamental to a democratic
society.”75 This is why, in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community
School District,76 the Court wrote:
First Amendment rights, applied in light of the special characteristics of the
school environment, are available to teachers and students. It can hardly be
argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom
of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate. This has been the
unmistakable holding of this Court for almost 50 years.77

Second, the Edwards court assumed that teachers had the academic
freedom to “supplant the present science curriculum with the
70. The depth of case law and legal analysis in this area is immense. This Essay
does not attempt to provide comprehensive coverage, but defers to and directs readers to
the following excellent articles written by qualified experts: David K. DeWolf, Academic
Freedom After Edwards, 13 REGENT U. L. REV. 448 (2000–01) [hereinafter DeWolf,
Academic Freedom]; David K. DeWolf et al., Teaching the Origins Controversy:
Science, or Religion, or Speech?, 2000 UTAH L. REV. 39, 98–110.
71. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402–03 (1923).
72. Epperson, 393 U.S. at 104–05. See also William W. Van Alstyne, Academic
Freedom and the First Amendment in the Supreme Court of the United States: An
Unhurried Historical Review, 53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 79 (1990).
73. Moore v. Gaston County Bd. of Educ., 357 F. Supp. 1037 (W.D. N.C. 1973).
74. Id. at 1039. The Moore court held that “[t]o discharge a teacher without
warning because his answers to scientific and theological questions do not fit the notions
of the local parents and teachers is a violation of the Establishment clause of the First
Amendment.” Id. at 1043.
75. Id. at 1039–40 (citation omitted).
76. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
77. Id. at 506.
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presentation of theories, besides evolution, about the origin of life”78
without needing the Balanced Treatment Act, which was struck down by
the Court on the grounds that the Act’s construction would lead to
limiting rather than advancing the academic freedom of teachers to offer
alternative views.79 The Webster court affirmed the principle that a
“school may not flatly prohibit teachers from mentioning relevant
material.”80 As DeWolf wrote, “The Supreme Court has been emphatic
in noting that in public schools, the suppression of ideas based upon a
disagreement with the ideas themselves is a violation of the First
Amendment.”81
III. CONCLUSION
In LeVake, the court correctly ruled against the plaintiff, but it should
have done so not because of his belief in the falsity of evolution or
because he sought to offer his students thoughtful nonsectarian
criticisms of evolutionary theory, but rather, because of his past
performance of teaching the class and his verbal admission that he could
not teach the prescribed curriculum. Discriminating against persons
because of their religious belief is de facto—not merely prima facie—
unconstitutional. Bringing into the classroom relevant material that
supplements the curriculum (and does not violate any other legal duties),
when public school teachers have adequately fulfilled all of their
curricular obligations, is protected speech under the rubric of academic
freedom.

78. Edwards, 482 U.S. at 587.
79. The court stated:
[U]nder the Act’s requirements, teachers who were once free to teach any and
all facets of this subject are now unable to do so. Moreover, the Act fails even
to ensure that creation science will be taught, but instead requires the teaching
of this theory only when the theory of evolution is taught.
Id. at 588–89.
80. Webster, 917 F.2d at 1008 (summarizing a principle enunciated in Zykan v.
Warsaw Community School Corp., 631 F.2d 1300, 1305–06 (7th Cir. 1980)).
81. DeWolf, Academic Freedom, supra note 70, at 479 (citing Bd. of Educ. v.
Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982)).
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